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This paper is on compulsion in active labour market programs (ALMP). When an unemployed worker has to 
participate in a programme order to remain eligible for benefits there are two separate effects. First, there is the 
treatment effect, i.e. the program makes the worker more attractive for a potential employer or makes search 
more efficient thus helping the unemployed worker to find a job more quickly. Second, there is the compulsion 
effect,  i.e.  because  the  worker  has  to  attend  the  program  his  value  of  being  unemployed  drops  and  he  is 
stimulated to find a job more quickly. So, both effects induce the worker to find a job more quickly. The 
difference  between  the  treatment  effect  and  the  compulsion  effect  concerns  the  quality  of  the  post-
unemployment job. The treatment effect improves the quality; the compulsion effect lowers the quality of post-
unemployment jobs.  
 
Keywords: compulsion, active labour market policies 
JEL-codes: J64, J68 
                                                 
§ Department of Economics and CentER, Tilburg University, The Netherlands; Department of Economics, University of 
Melbourne, Parkville, Australia; IZA and CEPR; vanours@uvt.nl  
 2 
 
1: Introduction  
 
Recent surveys of the effectiveness of active labour market policies indicate that most of the programs 
have at most limited effects. Kluve and Schmidt (2002) survey about 50 recent evaluation studies to 
conclude that programs with a large training content most likely improve employment probability. 
Furthermore, both direct job creation and employment subsidies in the public sector almost always fail. 
Kluve (2006) follows up on this and presents an analysis of about 100 evaluation studies of active 
labour  market  policy  programs  in  Europe,  most  of  them  operating  after  1990.  He  finds  that  the 
effectiveness of programs is quite independent of contextual factors such as labour market institutions 
and  macroeconomic  environment.  Training  programs  appear  to  have  at  most  a  modest  effect  on 
transitions from unemployment to work. Direct employment programs in the public sector are rarely 
effective  and  frequently  detrimental  for  the  employment  prospects  of  participants.  A  rational 
unemployed worker reading the evaluation literature might be tempted to take the results at face value 
and hence decide that it is better not to attend a training programme. However, both Kluve and Schmidt 
(2002) and Kluve (2006) conclude that providing job search assistance and counselling and monitoring 
accompanied by appropriate sanctions for non-compliance are effective and they are often found to be 
quite cost-effective because of their rather inexpensive nature. So, the rational unemployed worker may 
conclude that it is beneficial to attend a job search assistance programme. But, of course, it may be that 
it is not the job search assistance itself that speeds up job finding. Instead, it could be the monitoring 
that is an indistinguishable part of job search assistance which forces  unemployed to search  more 
intensively. Perhaps it is this compulsory element of the job search program that is driving the result.  
  This paper discusses compulsion in active labour market programmes. It does not provide new 
empirical evidence. The aim is to present and discuss in a systematic way how compulsory elements in 
ALMP  affect  the  behaviour  of  unemployed  workers.  To  structure  the  thinking  a  simple  search-
matching model is presented that distinguishes between a treatment effect and a compulsion effect. 
Compulsion in labour market programmes is not the exclusive domain of active labour market policies. 
Also in the provision of benefits there are compulsory elements. For example, when unemployment 
insurance benefits expire an unemployed worker faces a drop in income either because after expiration 
of  the  benefit  he  is  not  entitled to  any  benefit or  because he  will  receive a  lower  unemployment 
assistance benefit. To avoid this drop in income he is “forced” to find and accept a job offer. Another 3 
element of compulsion in unemployment insurance refers to the eligibility criteria. In order to remain 
entitled to unemployment insurance benefits the worker has to fulfil certain duties like looking for a 
job, accepting suitable job offers etcetera. If the worker fails to do so he may be punished, get a benefit 
sanction  imposed  and  face  a  lower  benefit  for  some  time.  So,  compulsion  comes  from  financial 
consequences of not behaving according to certain rules. Compulsion is not synonymous to coercion. 
Unemployed workers always have the opportunity to refuse looking for suitable jobs and to let benefits 
expire. However, if they do so they face a penalty because they may loose their benefits. This is also 
how compulsion in ALMP works. Workers can refuse to attend a program even if it is thought to be 
beneficial for them. But, if they do so they run the risk of loosing their benefits.  
  This paper is set-up as follows. In the next section a simple search-matching model is presented 
to  illustrate  how  ALMP  affect  the  functioning  of  labour  markets.  The  basic  assumption  in  the 
theoretical model is that ALMP have two different types of effects. First, they may have a treatment 
effect, i.e. they may be beneficial to the unemployed worker in terms of the speed of job finding. 
Second, they may have a compulsory element, which also speeds up job finding but has negative 
effects on the quality of post-unemployment jobs. The differences between the two types of effects are 
illustrated by showing the results of simulation exercises. Section 3 gives an overview of empirical 
studies,  which are  grouped  in  three categories  of  studies:  on  unemployment insurance  benefits,  in 
particular potential benefit durations, on benefit sanctions and on ALMP with a compulsory element. 
Unemployment  insurance  benefits  and  benefit  sanction  don’t  have  any  treatment  effects  but  their 
effects on behaviour show to what extent compulsion effects affect the labour market. ALMP often 
have a combination of treatment effect and compulsion effect. Many studies on job search assistance – 
counselling and monitoring – show that compulsion effects are very important even to the extent that 
they may be more important than the treatment effects. Section 4 concludes. 
 
 
2: Compulsion – theoretical framework 
2.1: A search-matching model
1 
 
To illustrate how compulsion in ALMP affects labour market behaviour of individual unemployed and 
thus the functioning of the labour market a simplified search-matching model of the labour market is 
                                                 
1 This section is an extension of the search-matching model presented in Boone and Van Ours (2006). 4 
used. The compulsion effect is considered to be identical to a decrease in the utility of unemployment; 
the treatment effect is equivalent to an increase of search effectiveness (the probability to get a job 
offer conditional on a contact). So the compulsion effect will increase the search intensity while the 
treatment effect will increase the acceptance probability because it makes the worker more attractive 
for  a  potential  employer  or  make  search  more  efficient,  i.e.  less  costly.  The  two  effects  are 
observationally equivalent but may have different implications. 
  Workers are assumed to be risk-neutral and cannot save; hence they consume all their income 
each period. This assumption rules out the possibility that agents save to insure themselves against the 
loss  of  income  due  to  unemployment.  Once  a  worker  becomes  unemployed,  he  receives  an 
unemployment benefit that is constant over the unemployment spell. For simplicity it is assumed that 
labour is homogeneous, i.e. all jobs offer the same wage w net of taxes while unemployed workers 
receive unemployment benefits bw, with b Î ￿0,1￿ being the replacement rate. Unemployed workers 
are looking for job offers and as soon as they get one they will accept it. Thus the unemployed have 
only one instrument of search, their search intensity. An unemployed worker is assumed to search for a 
job with search intensity s￿0. The disutility of searching at intensity s equals ￿(s), such that ￿(s) = ½￿￿ 
￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿>0. So the disutility of search increases with the search intensity with an increasing marginal 
disutility. The search for jobs generates a flow of job offers, which follow a Poisson process with 
arrival rate ￿s. The arrive rate consists of two parts, ￿ which is determined by the state of the labour 
market i.e. the number of vacancies and unemployed and s which is determined by optimising the 
behaviour of the unemployed worker. To illustrate the effects of compulsion in ALMP it is assumed 
that  all  unemployed  workers  have  to  attend  a  job  search  assistance  programme  that  last  from  the 
beginning of the unemployment spell until the worker finds a job. The job search programme affects 
the unemployed worker in two ways. First, learning increases the effectiveness of search the job search 
program reduces his search costs with a fraction ￿ Î ￿0,1￿. Second, the job search program reduces the 
utility  derived  from  the  flow  of  benefits  with  a  fraction  p  Î ￿0,1￿.  In  other  words  the  job  search 
program has the same effect  as a penalty on unemployment benefits.  Now the  following  Bellman 
equation can be derived for the unemployed workers, with Vu denoting the expected discounted vale of 
being unemployed:  
 
  ￿ Vu = maxs  {(1-p) b w – (1 – ￿) ￿(s) + ￿s (Ve – Vu)}          (1) 
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where Ve is the value of being employed and  ￿ is the discount rate. The flow value of unemployment 
consists of two parts: the flow of utility during unemployment (utility of benefits minus search costs) 
and the expected flow of additional income after the job is found. The optimal search intensity s* 
follows directly from differentiating equation (1) and is given by (1 – ￿) ￿' (s*) = ￿ (Ve – Vu) from 
which it is easy to derive that 
 
    ￿ (Ve – Vu) 
  s* =    (1 – ￿) ￿                    (2) 
 
So, the optimal search intensity increases with the difference between the values of employment and 
unemployment – and thus with the size of p – and with the job search subsidy ￿. Furthermore optimal 
search intensity is higher when costs are lower and the labour market is more tight. For the employed 
workers the following Bellman equation holds:  
 
  ￿ Ve =   w + ￿ (Vu – Ve)                  (3) 
 
where Ve is the expected discounted value of being employed and ￿ is the job separation rate, which is 
assumed to be exogenous. Equation (3) says that the flow value of being employed for a worker equals 
the utility from the wage he receives each period plus the probability ￿  that the match is dissolved, in 
which case he becomes unemployed and receives Vu instead of Ve. The value for the firm of employing 
a worker is denoted by Je and the value of posting a vacancy by Jv. These values satisfy the following 
Bellman equations: 
 
  ￿Je = y – (1 + ￿) w + ￿ (Jv – Je)                 (4) 
 
  ￿Jv = – c  + (￿/￿) (Je – Jv)                   (5) 
 
where y denote the per-period value of output of the worker-firm combination, ￿w the taxes paid by the 
firm, c is the per period cost of posting a vacancy and ￿ denotes labour market tightness. The labour 
market tightness, equal to the ratio of vacancies to the effective number of unemployed workers (v/su) 
is endogenised in the macro part of the model, i.e. in the matching process where unemployed and 6 
vacancies meet. The probability that a firm is matched with a worker equals ￿/￿ = ￿su/v, i.e. the ratio of 
the unemployment outflow to the number of vacancies. Equation (4) shows that the value for a firm of 
employing a worker equals the value of output minus total wage costs plus the probability ￿ that the 
match is dissolved and the firm has to post a vacancy. The value for the firm of posting a vacancy 
equals minus the cost of posting a vacancy plus the probability that the firm is matched with a worker, 
in which case it receives Je in stead of Jv. Assuming free entry into the job-creation business, the value 
of  posting  a  vacancy  Jv  =  0.  The  wage  is  determined  using  the  Nash  bargaining  solution.  The 
bargaining power of the firm is denoted by ￿ Î ￿0,1￿ and the bargaining power of the worker by 1 – ￿. 
Then, the net wage w solves 
 
  maxw (Ve – Vu)
1 – ￿ (Je – Jv)
￿                   (6) 
 
Assuming that the unemployment benefit level is defined on the economy-wide average wage, the 
individual worker' s choice of wage w does not affect the unemployment benefit he will receive when 
he becomes unemployed. So, in the Nash bargaining function ¶Vu/¶w = 0. Since from (3) it follows 
that (￿ + ￿) (Ve – Vu) = w – ￿Vu and from (4) it follows (￿ + ￿) (Je – Jv) =  y – (1 + ￿) w, the first-order 
condition for w can be written as 
 




  w =  ￿  ￿Vu  + (1 – ￿) y/(1 + ￿)                 (8) 
 
So, through the effect on the value of unemployment a change in the optimal search intensity affects 
the wage.
2 The higher the worker' s bargaining power, the higher his share of the after-tax surplus y/(1 + 
￿). In case the worker has full bargaining power (￿ = 0), the wage is equal to the total after-tax surplus. 
In case the employers have full bargaining power, the wage is such that the utility derived from it 
equals the discounted value of unemployment.  
                                                 
2 In the theoretical paper of their paper Van den Berg and Van der Klaauw (2006) ignore wage bargaining but model the 
wage effect of counselling directly by introducing a wage distribution and reservation wages. 
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  In the labour market unemployed workers and vacancies meet and match. Assuming a Cobb-
Douglas type matching function, the flow of matches equals 
 
  m = A (s u)
1-h v
h                    (9) 
 
with A and h Î ￿0,1￿ are the parameters of the matching function. The parameter ￿ in equation (1) is 
based on the matching process: ￿ = m/(su) = A ￿
h. Normalising the size of the labour force such that 
e+u = 1, for a steady state labour market in which inflow into unemployment equals outflow from 
unemployment it holds that d e =  ￿s u, from which we can derive equilibrium unemployment: 
 
  u = d/(d + ￿s)                     (10)  
 
The steady state unemployment rate increases with the job separation rate and decreases with the job 
finding rate. Finally, the costs of the ALMP are assumed to be negligible and the marginal tax rate is 
assumed to be exogenous. So on the one hand the costs of the program are ignored and on the other 
hand potential benefits in terms of reduced unemployment benefits are also ignored.  
 
 
2.2: Simulating ALMP in a search-matching model 
   
To illustrate the way compulsion effects and treatment effects in ALMP affects the functioning of the 
labour market some simulations are performed,  using equations (1) to (11).  In the baseline model 
compulsion and treatment in ALMP is ignored (p = s = 0). The simulations have been performed with 
the following parameter values: The replacement rate b = 0.7, the value of the discount rate r is set to 
0.025,  which  in  a  quarterly  set-up  would  imply  a  discount  rate  of  10%  on  an  annual  basis.  The 
parameter g of the search cost function is set to 0.5. The parameter h of the matching function is set to 
its usual value of 0.5, which implies that unemployment and vacancies have a similar effect on the flow 
of filled vacancies. The parameter A of the matching function is set to be equal to 1. This value is 
chosen in order to have a plausible unemployment duration. The parameter b of the wage negotiation 
process  is  set  equal  to  0.5.  Not  only  is  this  a  very  common  assumption,  it  also  implies  that  the 
parameter of the wage negotiation process is equal to the parameter of the matching function so that the 8 
efficiency condition of Hosios (1990) is fulfilled. The value of production y is set to 1, so the value of 
related variables like wages and vacancies costs are normalized. The vacancy costs c are set to 2, 
implying that in every period the costs for having a vacancy are twice the value of production. Of 
course, the total cost of a vacancy also depends on the average vacancy duration. Finally, the job 
destruction rate d is set to 0.04, which if the time period is thought as quarter implies that on an annual 
basis 16% of the jobs are destroyed. The marginal wage tax t is set at 0.3.  
  The simulation results of the baseline model are shown in the first column of Table 1. The 
unemployment rate is 8.7% and the vacancy rate is 1.9%. The average vacancy duration (q/m) is about 
6.6 weeks, so that the cost per vacancy is about 1.0. This means that the costs of a vacancy are about 
one quarter of production value. The average unemployment duration (1/m) is about 2 quarters. Under 
these conditions the net wage is equal to 0.75. Taking the taxes into account this means that the wage 
costs are equal to 0.97, which is quite high compared to the value of production. The main reason for 
this is the free entry condition Jv = 0. This implies that employers only need to cover the wage costs and 
the expected cost of opening a vacancy. Should we have included capital in the production process the 
employers would need a larger share of the value of production in order to cover their investment in 
capital. However, the basic results of our simulations would not change because of this. 
  The second column of Table 1 shows the simulation results if there is an ALMP that reduces the 
search costs of unemployed workers with 25% (s = 0.25). The search intensity goes up from 0.828 to 
0.968. Because of this the unemployment rate drops from 8.7% to 8.0%. Because of the reduced search 
costs the value of being unemployed goes up, which strengthens the bargaining position of the workers 
and increases their wage. This causes the vacancy rate to drop. 
  The third column of Table 1 shows the simulation results if the ALMP only has a compulsion 
effect i.e. the programme does not help unemployed to find a job but has a ' threat effect'  because of the 
time involved in attending the program (p = 0.1). Now the search intensity goes up from 0.828 to 
0.936.  The  unemployment  rate  goes  down.  Because  of  the  compulsory  part  of  the  labour  market 
program the value of unemployment goes down. Because this weakens the bargaining position of the 
workers the wage drops which causes the vacancy rate to go up.  
  The fourth column of Table 1 shows the simulation results if the unemployed have to attend a 
labour market program which both helps them to find a job more quickly and reduced their value of 
being unemployed (s = 0.25; p=0.10). Now search intensity goes up a lot causing the unemployment 
rate to drop substantially. The wage effects cancel out leaving the wage at the same level as the wage 9 
without the labour market program.  
  Figure 1 illustrates the treatment effects of ALMP for a range of values of s. As shown with an 
increase in s - a reduction in the search costs – the search intensity goes up at an increasing rate, as 
does the wage. As the search costs diminish search intensity rises more and more. Figure 2 illustrates 
the compulsion effects of ALMP. Here too, search intensity goes up with the perceived penalty, but at a 
diminishing rate. Because of the weakening of the bargaining position the wage goes down.  
  All in all, the way ALMP affect the behaviour of unemployed workers is twofold. First there is 
an effect on search intensity and thus unemployment duration. Second there is an effect on the wage i.e. 
the quality of the post-unemployment job. The compulsory part makes the state of unemployment more 
expensive to be in; in other words the unemployed worker derives less utility from being unemployed. 
The  drop  in  the  value  of  being  unemployed  increases  the  search  intensity  but  lowers  the  post-
unemployment wage. The treatment part lowers the costs of search and therefore increases the search 
intensity. However, due to lower search costs the value of unemployment increases causing an increase 
in the post-unemployment wage.  
The parameter values are chosen to reflect a real-life labour market but they do not represent a 
particular country. The replacement rate of 0.7 represents average workers in countries like France, The 
Netherlands, Spain and Switzerland. It may be high for countries like the U.K., Austria or Italy where 
the replacement rate is about 0.5. If the model simulations would have been based on this lower value 
of the replacement rate search intensity would be higher, but the effects of the reduction in search costs 
and the “penalty” on the search intensity would be very similar. In the same way the choice of the job 
destruction rate is arbitrary but again the general pattern of the results wouldn’t change with other 
parameter values. Finally the marginal tax rate of 0.3 is low but again increasing the value doesn’t 




3: Reviewing the literature – empirical studies on compulsion 
 
After unemployment benefits expire unemployed workers may collect lower unemployment assistance 
benefits  or  no  benefits  at  all.  If  there  is  maximum  unemployment  benefit  duration,  workers  will 
anticipate  the  end  of  the  benefit  period  and  behave  accordingly,  i.e.  search  intensity  goes  up  or 10 
reservation  wages  go  down  to  find  a  job  more  quickly  and  avoid  running  out  of  unemployment 
insurance benefits. The incentives from the drop in benefits are comparable to the incentives created by 
the  compulsory  nature  of  some  ALMP.  Also,  in  anticipation  of  the  drop  in  benefits  unemployed 
workers may change their behaviour. This too, is similar to what might happen to an unemployed 
worker  who  is  informed  that  he  has  to  attend  a  labour  market  program.  He  may  perceive  the 
programme as a punishment because participation reduces leisure time and the announcement of the 
program may induce him to search for a job more intensively. Because of these similarities the first part 
of this section discusses studies on unemployment insurance benefits with a focus on the effects of 
potential benefit durations. If a worker perceives a labour market program as a punishment, then having 
to go to a programme resembles getting a benefit sanction imposed. To avoid such a benefit sanction or 
to avoid having to go to a programme, the unemployed worker may search more intense. Once a 
benefit  sanction  is  imposed  or  the  unemployed  worker  attends  the  programme,  the  value  of 
unemployment has gone down and therefore search intensity is increased. Because of these similarities 
the second part of this section presents studies on benefit sanctions. Finally, in the third part of this 
section  studies  of  the  effectiveness  of  ALMP  are  discussed,  focussing  on  studies  that  distinguish 
between the compulsory and treatment elements of the programmes. 
 
 
3.1: Unemployment insurance benefits 
 
If ALMP have both a treatment and a compulsion effect, studying compulsion effects in isolation may 
be  helpful.  The  characteristics  of  the  UI  insurance  generate  compulsion  effects  only.  In  theory, 
unemployment insurance provides a disincentive for job seeking, which is affected both by the level of 
benefits (relative to the expected wage) and by the potential benefit duration (PBD). The greater the 
level of benefits, the less costly the period of the job search, so workers tend to search for jobs less 
intensely and tend to remain unemployed longer. Putting a limit on the duration of benefits tends to 
affect search behaviour. In the theoretical model from the previous section introducing such a limit 
implies that the utility of being unemployed is reduced. The threat of benefit expiration speeds up the 
job search. 
  In line with theoretical predictions, empirical studies confirm the link between the PBD and the 
duration of unemployment insurance benefits. Katz and Meyer (1990), for example, estimate that a 11 
one-week increase in PBD increases the average duration of unemployment insurance recipients by 
about one day. Card and Levine (2000) report a disincentive effect of about 0.5 day per additional week 
of PBD, also based on U.S. data. Lalive and Zweimüller (2004) report a disincentive effect of about 0.4 
day for Austrian benefit recipients. The PBD affects not only the duration of unemployment but also 
the pattern of the exit rate. As the date approaches when benefits will expire, unemployed workers tend 
to increase the intensity of their job search and reduce their reservation wage so the rate of job finding 
increases.  Thus,  the  exhaustion  of  benefits  creates  a  "spike"  in  the  exit  rate  from  unemployment. 
Indeed, many studies find a sharp increase in the exit rate from unemployment just before benefits 
expire (Katz and Meyer (1990), Card and Levine (2000), and Addison and Portugal (2004) find such 
“spikes” for U.S. benefit recipients. Carling, Edin, Harkman and Holmlund (1996) 
find spikes for Sweden in both the job-finding rate and the exit rate from unemployment to labour 
market programs. Roed and Zhang (2003) find end-of-benefit spikes for Norway, while Lalive and 
Zweimüller (2004) and Lalive, Van Ours, and Zweimüller (2004) find spikes in unemployment exit 
rates shortly before benefits expire for Austria. Nevertheless, after reviewing all the evidence Card et 
al. (2007) conclude that the size of the spike may be limited; they attribute a large part of the spikes to 
be the result of measurement error because many studies only follow unemployed workers as long as 
they collect benefits.  
  Concerning the effect of unemployment benefits not only the duration  of unemployment is 
relevant, but also the quality of post-unemployment jobs. Several studies have investigated the effects 
of unemployment insurance on the duration of post-unemployment jobs. One recent study finds that 
while the occurrence of unemployment severely reduces the duration of subsequent job tenure, the 
duration of unemployment has no deleterious impact – in fact, longer durations of unemployment are 
rewarded by longer job tenures, presumably because a longer period of job search improved worker-job 
match  (Böheim  and  Taylor,  2002).  But  Portugal  and  Addison  (2003)  find  no  evidence  that 
unemployment benefits facilitate entry into stable jobs in Portugal. Belzil (2001) using Canadian data 
finds a negative correlation between unemployment duration and subsequent job duration, but this 
correlation is mostly explained through the negative correlation between individual heterogeneity of the 
job finding rate and the job separation rate. Other studies include Jurajda (2002), who uses U.S. data 
and finds that eligibility for UI reduces workers’ employment durations, and Tatsiramos (2006), who 
uses data for ten European countries and finds that post-unemployment jobs last longer in countries 
with  relatively  generous  UI.  Using  U.S.  data,  Centeno  (2004)  finds  that  a  more  generous 12 
unemployment insurance (UI) system is positively related to post-unemployment job tenure. Moreover, 
Card et al. (2006), using Austrian data, find that extending the duration of potential benefits lengthens 
the spell of unemployment but has little or no effect on the quality of subsequent job matches. Van 
Ours  and  Vodopivec  (2007)  investigate  whether  greatly  shortening  the  potential  duration  of 
unemployment benefits in Slovenia affected the quality of post-unemployment jobs. If reducing the 
potential  duration  of  benefits  forces  unemployed  workers  to  accept  lower-quality  jobs,  their  post-
unemployment jobs would be less likely to be permanent and more likely to be temporary, low in pay, 
and short-term. But no evidence of such an impact is found. Reducing the potential duration of benefits 
did not affect the likelihood of a worker taking a temporary rather than a permanent job, had hardly any 
effect on job separation rates (the likelihood of losing a post-unemployment job within a year), and did 
not affect post-unemployment wages.  
  From these studies on the effect of potential benefit duration it is clear that shorter durations 
increase the job finding rate while the quality of post-unemployment jobs seems to remain unaffected. 
The first finding is in line with theory in which a reduction of the value of unemployment stimulates 
unemployed workers to find a job more quickly. The second finding is somewhat surprising from a 
theoretical point of view. The reduction in the value of unemployment should have reduced the quality 
of the post-unemployment jobs. This not being the case suggests that benefit recipients might have 
behaved opportunistically and did not spend additional time on job search at all.   
 
 
3.2: Benefit sanctions 
 
Benefit sanctions are easy to introduce in the theoretical model presented in the previous section. The 
compulsory  part  of  ALMP  (p)  could  also  be  read  as  an  actual  penalty  imposed  on  workers.  The 
reduction of benefits increased search intensity. To capture the full effects of benefit sanctions the 
theoretical model would have to be expanded with a monitoring part because the unemployed worker 
will only get a benefit sanction imposed is search intensity too low (see Boone and Van Ours (2006) for 
details.  
There are a couple of empirical studies that investigate the effects of benefit sanctions. Abbring 
et  al.  (2005)  analyse  how  in  the  Netherlands  benefit  sanctions  affected  the  transition  out  of 
unemployment. According to the Dutch UI law there are three categories of infringements for which 13 
workers can have benefit sanctions imposed: lack of effort to find a job (search intensity too low, 
declining job offers), administrative infringements (reporting too late), and other infringements (fraud, 
inaccurate information). UI agencies were authorized, but not obliged, to impose a sanction on a UI 
claimant who did not comply with the rules. The sanction is a temporary or a permanent full or partial 
reduction of the benefit level. In practice, the temporary partial reduction of the benefits ranged from 
5% during 4 weeks to 25 or 30% during 13 weeks. Abbring et al. find that re-employment rates are 
significantly and substantially raised by imposition of a benefit sanction. Van den Berg et al. (2004) 
analyse  the  effects  of  sanctions  on  the  behaviour  of  Unemployment  Assistance  (UA;  sometimes 
referred to as welfare benefits) recipients in Rotterdam. A recipient of UA has similar obligations as a 
UI recipient in order to remain eligible for a benefit. The duration and size of the reduction depend on 
the nature of the infringement ranging from 5% during 1 month to 20% during 4 months. It turns out 
that a benefit sanction raises the transition rate from welfare to work by more than 140%, so the job 
finding rate more than doubles. The benefit sanction itself is temporary, but the effects turn out to be 
long lasting. Even after the sanction period expires the transition rate from welfare to work is higher 
than before the sanction was imposed. From an analysis of Swiss data on benefit sanctions Lalive et al. 
(2005) conclude that by imposing a benefit sanction the unemployment duration decreases by roughly 
three weeks. From these studies on benefit sanctions it is clear that reducing benefits speeds up job 
finding.  There  are  no  studies  that investigate  whether  shorter  unemployment  durations  induced by 
benefit sanctions affect the quality of post-unemployment jobs.    
  Benefits  sanctions  refer  to  temporary  or  permanent  reductions  in  benefits.  They  affect  the 
behaviour of unemployed workers in two ways – through an ex ante and through an ex post effect. The 
ex ante effect refers to the optimal search intensity of unemployed workers who did not yet received a 
benefit sanction but who are aware of the possibility that they might be confronted with a benefit 
sanction. Then the optimal search intensity is higher than it would be if workers would not face the 
possibility of getting a sanction imposed. The ex post effect refers to the effect on search of having 
lower benefits once a sanction is imposed. Boone and Van Ours (2006) who study benefit sanctions 
from a theoretical point of view find that a system with monitoring and sanctions represents a welfare 
improvement  relative  to  other  alternatives.  The  effect  of  benefit  sanctions  goes  beyond  the  direct 
effects  of  workers  searching  more  intense.  The  increase  in  search  intensity  may  also  stimulate 
employers to open up new vacancies. Boone and Van Ours (2006) show that this macro spill over 
effect may be an important mechanism to reduce unemployment in addition to the micro behavioural 14 
effect of increased search intensity that reduces unemployment duration. Boone et al (2006) analyse the 
design of optimal unemployment insurance in a search equilibrium framework where search effort 
among the unemployed is not perfectly observable. They examine to what extent the optimal policy 
should  involve  monitoring  of  search  effort  and  benefit  sanctions  if  observed  search  is  found 
insufficient.  Their  results  suggest  that  the  introduction  of  a  system  with  monitoring  and  sanctions 
represents a welfare improvement.  
 
 
3.3: Compulsory elements in ALMP 
 
Labour market programs often consist of a combination of treatment and compulsion
3. The treatment 
concerns help to the unemployed worker in building up human capital through for example training or 
work experience programs or help through advice on job search strategies. The compulsion concerns an 
increase of cost of being unemployed either through mandatory activities that are time consuming. It 
could also be that workers increase their job finding rate because of a “threat effect”, i.e. they want to 
avoid having to enter a labour market program. Evaluation of the effectiveness of ALMP is not easy 
because of potentially selectivity in the inflow into ALMP. Although there are several possibilities to 
account for this potential selectivity the most straightforward way is to use a controlled experiment. 
There are a couple of studies that have an experimental set-up.  
Dolton  and  O’Neill  (1996)  present  an  analysis  of  the  British  “Restart  programme”  which 
consisted  of  a  series  of  compulsory  six-monthly  interviews  for  unemployed  workers  starting  after 
having been registered as unemployed for 6 months. During this mandatory interview the counsellor 
assessed  the  recent  unemployment  history  of  the  worker  and  offered  advice  on  search  behaviour, 
training courses and sometimes initiated direct contact with employers. Unemployed were randomly 
assigned to the treatment group and the control group, who were eligible but did not have to attend the 
first interview. Those that were assigned to the treatment group were faced with the possibility of 
having their benefits reduced if the didn’t attend the Restart interview or if they were consider not to be 
making  sufficient  effort  in  finding  a  job.  Dolton  and  O’Neill  find  that  the  Restart  interviews 
significantly  decrease  the  unemployment  durations.  Some  individuals  leave  the  unemployment 
                                                 
3 Kreiner and Tranæs (2005) show that in a situation in which job search is unobservable it may be optimal to introduce 
workfare, i.e. requiring unproductive activities in exchange for UI benefits. Workfare allows for a distinction in 
incentives between voluntary and involuntary unemployed. 15 
registers without having found a job; this is common among women and other groups “who are most 
likely not to be genuinely available for work”. This type of outflow from unemployment is particularly 
high  around  the  timing  of  the  first  Restart  interview,  which  indicates  a  threat  effect.  However, 
measured over a period of 18 months also the exits to a job are significantly different for the treatment 
group and the control group. In a follow-up paper Dolton and O’Neill (2002) investigate the long-run 
effects of the Restart programme finding that the Restart interviews reduced the male unemployment 
rate five years later by 6 percentage points, as compared to a control group for whom participation in 
the first six-monthly interview took place six months later. 
Klepinger et al. (2002) present the results of an experimental evaluation of alternative work-
search requirements imposed on unemployment benefit recipients in Maryland (USA). Assignment to 
control and treatment groups was – randomly – based on social security numbers. The control group of 
unemployed workers had the standard obligation to contact 2 employers per week and report those 
contacts in order to remain eligible for unemployment benefits payments. The Maryland experiment 
distinguished  four  treatment  groups  who  were  informed  about  their  duties  within  one  week  after 
registering for a benefit claim.
4 The first group had to make four employer contacts per week, the 
second group was informed that they had to search actively without specifying the number of contacts 
they had to make, the third group had to attend a four day job search workshop – lasting 16 hours – 
early in the unemployment spell. The fourth group was informed that their claimed employer contacts 
would be verified. As discussed extensively in the previous sections there are two effects of increased 
work-search requirements. First, the treatment effect: unemployed may make more job contacts, which 
increases the job finding rate. Second, the compulsion effect: the additional requirements raise the non-
monetary costs of remaining unemployed, which leads to more intense job search and a reduction in 
reservation wages (or both). By comparing the four groups enabled Klepinger et al. tried to make a 
distinction between the two effects. The non-monetary costs of imposing additional search requirement 
turned out to be important for the duration of benefit claims. Increasing the required weekly number of 
employer contacts from two to four and indicating that employer contacts would be verified reduced 
the duration of unemployment benefit spells with almost a week, which is a substantial effect since the 
average unemployment benefit duration was about 12 weeks. Also, eliminating a specific number of 
                                                 
4 In order to investigate whether information about the experiment affected the results of the experiment two control groups 
were distinguished. One group was informed about the experiment; the other wasn’t. This was done to check for the so 
called Hawthorne effect, which refers to the outcome of an experiment being caused by individuals that change their 
behaviour not because of the treatment they receive but because they realized they were under study (see also Meyer, 
1995). The authors find that the two control groups did not behave differently, so the Hawthorne effect is absent.  16 
required contacts increased the unemployment benefit duration. Finally, also the obligation to attend a 
job  search  workshop  reduced  unemployment  benefit  duration.  This  was  at  least  partly  due  to  the 
compulsion effect because many unemployed left unemployment shortly before their search workshop 
was planned. It is not clear whether in addition to the compulsion effect there was also a treatment. The 
effect  of  the treatments  on  the  quality  of  post-unemployment  jobs –  in  terms of  employment and 
earnings – are small or absent.  
Black  et  al.  (2003)  present  an  analysis  of  an  experiment  from  Kentucky.  Unemployed  are 
ranked in 20 categories according to a profiling score based on the expected unemployment duration. 
Local  budgets  available  for  reemployment  services  are  allocated  to  the  unemployed  according  to 
profiling  scores,  starting  with  highest  score,  i.e.  the  longest  expected  duration.  In  case  there  is 
insufficient budget for all unemployed and the marginal group cannot be covered completely either, 
there is a random allocation of reemployment services to the unemployed in the marginal group. By 
comparing the treated with the non-treated Black et al. find that the reemployment services stimulate 
workers to leave unemployment more quickly; those that leave unemployment quickly do not earn 
lower wages, which suggests that there is “no long-term harm from the treatment provided by the 
program”. The main action caused by the mandatory reemployment services is in the beginning of the 
unemployment spell, i.e. unemployed that were notified of their obligations to attend the reemployment 
service program left unemployment quickly to avoid having to enter the programme. In other words, 
the  threat  effect  is  driving  the  results.  Apparently,  many  unemployed  consider  the  reemployment 
service programs as sanctions that they prefer to avoid.   
Van den Berg and Van der Klaauw (2006) analyse the outcome of a small-scale experiment on 
counselling and monitoring in the Netherlands. They distinguish between two types of job search, 
formal and informal job search. Formal job search concerns search through personnel advertisements 
and public employment offices. Informal job search refers to direct contacts with employers and search 
through  friends,  relatives  or  employed  workers.  They  argue  that  counselling  and  monitoring  only 
concerns formal job search. Monitoring leads to a substitution of effort from informal to formal search, 
which reduces the effectiveness of monitoring. At the time of the experiment in the Netherlands at the 
start of the unemployment spell unemployed were classified into one of four types based on objective 
characteristics and subjective evaluation. Type 2-4 unemployed are offered assistance to find a job 
while Type 1 unemployed are expected to have sufficient skills to find a job without assistance. The 
experiment was limited to Type 1 unemployed who were randomly assigned to a treatment group and a 17 
control group. The control group had to report on search activities every week while in addition to this 
requirement  the  treatment  group  unemployed  had  regular  meetings  with  counsellors  during  which 
initially quality of application letters and resume were examined and a plan was made while during 
follow-up meetings plans from previous meetings were evaluated and a planning for the next period 
was  made.  If  the  unemployed  did  not  comply  he  could  be  punished  with  a  benefit  sanction  –  a 
reduction of the UI benefits with 10% for a period of 2 months. In their baseline estimate Van den Berg 
and Van der Klaauw find no significant treatment effect, i.e. counselling and monitoring doesn’t help 
the unemployed to find a job more quickly. However, they also find that counselling and monitoring 
affects the type of search, unemployed that are subject to counselling and monitoring shift their search 
from informal to formal channels. Van den Berg and Van der Klaauw (2006) conclude that focusing of 
monitoring  on  unemployed  with  less  favourable  characteristics  may  make  more  sense  since  these 
individuals have less scope for substituting informal for formal search channels.  
  Graversen and Van Ours (2006) analyse data from a Danish experiment that on the basis of 
birth date randomly assigned unemployed to control and treatment groups. The treatment group of 
unemployed  was  confronted  with  mandatory  activities  whereas  the  control  group  was  not.  The 
unemployed in the treatment group were informed by letter about their duties within 1 to 2 weeks after 
becoming unemployed. The letter gave a short description of the activities contained in the program. 
After 5 to 6 weeks of unemployment individuals had to participate in a job search program that lasted 2 
weeks. After the program the individuals had to attend meetings once a week or once every second 
week. The purpose of the meetings was to assist individuals in their job search and to monitor job 
search efforts. The individuals could also receive job offers mediated by the PES. Before individuals 
were unemployed for 4 months they had to receive an offer to participate in an activation program with 
a duration of at least 3 months. Longer classroom training courses (with a duration of more than 3 
months) could not be offered at this stage. Individuals who did not find a job after 6-7 months had to 
participate in a longer meeting with a caseworker and a new job plan was made. The job plan contained 
a description of the activities to improve the chances of finding a job. All available active measures 
could be used at this stage including longer education programs. The services offered to the control 
group during the early stage of the unemployment period were much less intensive than the services 
offered to the treatment group.
5 Individuals in the control group typically would have to participate in 
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frequently.  18 
an  activation  program  after  one  year  of unemployment.  The  job  search  programs,  which  typically 
started after 5 to 6 weeks gave an overview of available courses and educations, general knowledge 
about the labour market and specific knowledge about the possibilities to find particular jobs. The 
participants  were  also  assisted  in  their  job  search,  and  they  are  trained  in  job  search  techniques. 
Graversen and Van Ours find that already before the start of the job search program the job finding rate 
in the treatment group is higher than in the control group. Figure 3 presents the survival functions 
separately  for  the  treatment  group  and  control  group.  As  shown  the  treatment  group  leaves 
unemployment more quickly than the control group. After 3 months 47% of the control group and 54% 
of  the  treatment group  have  left  unemployment.  After 6  months  28% of  the  control  group  is  still 
unemployed while only 21% of the treatment group is still unemployed. The difference between both 
survival  functions  increases  up  to  13  weeks  of  unemployment,  stays  constant  until  26  weeks  and 
declines after that. Figure 3 also shows that the median unemployment duration for the control group is 
about 14 weeks while for the treatment group this is 11.5 weeks. Clearly there is a substantial treatment 
effect. From difference in job finding rates early on in the unemployment spell it is clear that there is a 
compulsion effect. Some workers who are faced with the prospect of having to attend a job search 
program  are  stimulated  to  leave  unemployment  quickly.  Graversen  and  Van  Ours  conclude  that 
positive treatment effects related to the job search programs cannot be ruled out but very likely the 
compulsion effect is more important. 
.  Blundell et al. (2004) and Geerdsen (2006) present recent non-experimental evaluations of the 
nature  of  particular  ALMP.  Blundell  et  al.  (2004)  study  the  impact  of  the  British  labour  market 
programme  “New  Deal  for  the  Young  Unemployed”,  which  was  compulsory  and  directed  to 
unemployed  aged  between  18  and  24.  The  programme  consisted  of  initial  intensive  job  search 
assistance followed by various subsidized options including wage subsidies to employers. Blundell et 
al. focus on the enhanced job search assistance, which also included meeting with a “personal advisor” 
who the unemployed meet at least once every two weeks to encourage/enforce job search. Blundell et 
al. do not have experimental data but they exploit area-based piloting and age-related eligibility rules to 
identify treatment effects. They find that the programme increased the job finding rate of young men 
but they also indicate that it is unclear whether the “carrot” of job assistance drives this positive effect 
or the “stick” of the tougher monitoring of job search. Geerdsen (2006) identifies the threat effect of 
Danish labour market programs by exploiting legislative changes in the length of the period in which 
individuals can receive UI benefits without having to participate in a labour market program. The threat 19 
effect results in an almost 100 per cent increase in the job finding rate.  
   
 
4: Concluding remarks 
 
ALMP may affect the job search process directly by providing job search assistance or indirectly by 
affecting  the  human  capital  of  participants  and  making  unemployed  more  attractive  for  potential 
employers. However, building up human capital is not an easy task. Returns to schooling estimates 
show that it takes a year of schooling to increase a persons'  wage with 6-9 percent. With a similar rate 
of return to training, a 1 month training program will lead to an increase of 0.6-0.75 percent, too small 
perhaps to be noticed. If human capital is built up so slowly it is not difficult to imagine that the job 
finding rate is not much affected by short training courses. Long training courses may not help much 
either. If a course takes a long time a worker may get “locked-in”, i.e. he or she will reduce search 
intensity to compensate for the time spent in the course. 
An important question is whether administrators should force unemployed workers to attend a 
program if the effectiveness of such a program is not obvious. Even if the program does not increase 
the human capital of the workers that attend the program it will increase the costs of being unemployed 
and therefore reduce disincentive effects related to high level or long lasting benefits.
6  
  The  potential  drawback  of  compulsion  is  that  although  it  may  reduce  the  duration  of 
unemployment spells it could also have a negative effect on the quality of post-unemployment jobs. 
However, recent research indicates that one shouldn' t worry too much. The bottom line is that ALMP 
have positive effects on the job finding rates thus reducing unemployment duration. There are two 
effects which potentially responsible for this: a treatment effect and a compulsion effect both of which 
work  in  the  same  direction.  Search  intensity  goes  up  as  does  the  acceptance  probability  and  the 
efficiency  of  search.  Both  effects  increase  the  job  finding  rate  and  are  usually  observationally 
equivalent.  Concerning  the  quality  of  the  post-unemployment  jobs  the  effects  work  in  opposite 
direction.  The  treatment  effect  increases  the  quality,  the  compulsion  effect  reduces  the  quality.  In 
empirical studies on for example mandatory job search programs often no effect is found on the quality 
of post-unemployment jobs. This could be because both the treatment and the compulsion effect matter 
and  cancel  out.  Surprisingly  little  research  is  done  on  the  elements  of  compulsion  in  ALMP,  in 
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particular on the way compulsion affects the quality of post-unemployment jobs.  
It may be that some policies work for all groups of unemployed workers but these are more 
activation policies than active labour market policies. A policy that seems to work for a wide range of 
unemployed  workers  and  labour  market  conditions  is  counselling  and  monitoring  accompanied by 
benefit sanctions. Clearly individuals have at least some influence on their labour market career. If they 
decide to search more intense for their job or lower their reservation wage they are likely to find that 
job sooner. Such a policy is merely an activation device since it does not improve the human capital of 
individual workers and does not help them to identify successful search strategies. As long as it is not 
clear  as  to  why  some  programs  work  and  other  don' t,  until  we  find  evidence  contradicting  that 
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Table 1: Results of simulations 
 
    (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Subsidy search costs  s  0  0.25  0  0.25 
Compulsion effect   p  0  0  0.1  0.1 
           
Search intensity  s  0.828  0.968  0.936  1.093 
Unemployment rate  u  0.087  0.080  0.073  0.067 
Vacancy rate  v  0.019  0.018  0.020  0.019 
Duration unemployment  Tu  1.97  2.10  1.85  1.98 
Duration vacancy  Tv  0.51  0.48  0.54  0.51 
Wage  w  0.747  0.750  0.744  0.747 




Figure 1: Effect of search cost subsidies on search intensity and wages 
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